Methodology in Cognitive Linguistics
Why Cognitive Linguistics is not yet as empirical as might be
Reasons of principle
In addition to this absence of empirical tendencies in the dominant public image of Cognitive Linguistics– both in terms of the attitude of its leading figures and in terms of its best-known fields of application– there might be a more principled reluctance with regard to cutting edge empirical work. Cognitive Linguistics considers itself to be a non-objectivist theory of language, whereas the use of corpus materials involves an attempt to maximalize the objective basis of linguistic descriptions. Is an objectivist methodology compatible with a non-objectivist theory? Isn’t any attempt to reduce the role of introspection and intuition in linguistic research contrary to the spirit of Cognitive Linguistics, which stresses the semantic aspects of the language– and the meaning of linguistic expressions is the least tangible of linguistic phenomena. Because meanings do not present themselves directly in the corpus data, will introspection not always be used in any cognitive analysis of language? (For an explicit defense of such a position, albeit in terms of ‘intuition’ rather than ‘introspection’, see Itkonen 2003.)
There seems to exist a tension, in other words, between a broad methodological tendency in Cognitive Linguistics that considers introspection the most or perhaps the only appropriate method for studying meaning, and a marginal but increasing tendency to apply empirical methods that are customary in the other cognitive sciences.
To summarize: the dissemination of empirical methods in Cognitive Linguistics is far from complete, because some of the leading figures adhere (if not in principle, at least in practice) to a more traditional linguistic methodology; because the most broadly appealing branches of Cognitive Linguistics tend to be the methodologically least constrained ones; because the use of empirical methods is insufficiently incorporated in Cognitive Linguistics programs; and maybe also because there is a certain degree of theoretical skepticism with regard to empirical methods.
Because the latter argument is clearly the most fundamental one (it is the only one that could not be countered on a very practical level), let us try to assess its weight. Just how essential is a principled skepticism with regard to empirical methods? The argument may in fact be construed in two ways, a minimalist and a maximalist one. The minimalist position entails that empirical methods may never completely replace a more interpretative approach: even though it is granted that empirical methods yield highly valuable circumstantial evidence with regard to the semantics of natural language, there is an irreducible core to meaning that cannot be accessed from the outside, with the indirect evidence provided by objective methods, but that necessarily has to be experienced subjectively. The maximalist position involves the view that a hermeneutic, interpretative methodology is not only inevitable but also vastly superior when it comes to the study of meaning, and that the addition of empirical evidence is basically superfluous. The minimalist reading of the skeptical argument, in short, implies that empirical evidence is not sufficient for a proper study of meaning, while the maximalist reading implies that it is not necessary.
Both arguments can be easily countered. The minimalist reading of the skeptical argument will not stand in the way of an attempt to maximize the benefit that one can get from empirical evidence. Even if you accept that subjectivity cannot be reduced for a 100%, the practical imperative for research will be to push the employment of methods aspiring to objectivity as far as it can gets– that is to say, the practical consequences of the minimalist position will be virtually non-existent: you would still try to pursue the empirical line of research as far as you can take it.
The maximalist reading of the skeptical argument, on the other hand, will have difficulty to stand up against the line of reasoning. If it is indeed important for the further progress of linguistics to achieve a higher degree of intertheoretical comparability, staying with highly subjective methods of research would simply be counterproductive. How could a maximalist interpretation be superior if it does not increase objectivity and comparability? A shift towards a minimalist reading of the skeptical stance– “let’s try to reduce subjectivity to the maximal extent, even if we may not be able to do so in any absolute sense”– would then be inevitable.
In addition, there is compelling evidence that introspective evidence is not a superior method of linguistic description. In general terms, this was established by Labov in his seminal 1972 article, in which he clearly identifies the dangers of “armchair linguistics”. More specifically with regard to the description of meaning in the context of Cognitive Linguistics, Geeraerts, Grondelaers and Bakema (1994) compare the results of an introspective analysis of Wierzbicka’s with a data-based description, concluding that the analysis presented by Wierzbicka (who is one of the most explicit defendants of an introspective approach) is either plainly inadequate, or formulated in such a way that it is immune to criticism.
